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Paying for Performance: The Education Impacts of a Community College Scholarship 





We evaluate the effect of performance-based incentive programs on educational outcomes for 
community college students from a random assignment experiment at three campuses. Incentive 
payments over two semesters were tied to meeting two conditions—enrolling at least half time 
and maintaining a “C” or better grade point average. Eligibility increased the likelihood of 
enrolling in the second semester after random assignment and total number of credits earned. 
Over two years, program group students completed nearly 40 percent more credits. We find little 
evidence that program eligibility changed types of courses taken but some evidence of increased 




While the total (monetary and nonmonetary) benefits of attending a two- or four-year 
college are seemingly quite high, less than 60 percent of the population 25 to 35 years old reports 
having any college experience (Crissey 2009). Even among those who begin college, many have 
not completed any degree six years after their initial enrollment. This is particularly true at two-
year colleges which enroll 48 percent of all first-time, first-year college students (Berkner and 
Choy 2008).
1 Six years after first enrollment, only 14 percent of students beginning at 
community colleges have completed an associate’s degree, and only 12 percent have completed a 
bachelor’s degree.  Nearly one-half have no degree and are no longer enrolled in school.
2 As a 
result, many researchers and policy-makers have questioned whether there are policies that can 
increase enrollment persistence and completion rates at the college level. This paper examines 
one such policy—performance-based scholarships—focused on improving academic success and 
persistence at community colleges. 
Recently, there has been much interest in the ability of incentive awards and scholarships 
to improve student outcomes. In this paper, we explore whether a performance-based scholarship 
combined with counseling services affected the educational outcomes of low-income community 
college students (who were also parents). Students were randomly assigned to treatment and 
control groups. The treatment group was eligible to receive scholarship payments over two 
semesters for meeting certain benchmarks during the semester and also had access to 
supplemental counseling services. These were in addition to the standard financial aid and 
                                                 
1 Relative to the typical four-year institution, community colleges lower the costs of investing in a college education: 
their open enrollment policies enable students who lack full preparation to invest in a college education, while their 
relatively low tuition and fees make college more affordable to all students. 
2 In comparison, 22 percent of students who begin in a public four-year institution and 19 percent of students who 
begin in a private (not-for-profit) four-year institution have no degree and are no longer enrolled in school 6 years 
after first enrollment (Radford, et al., 2010). 2 
 
counseling services available to control group students. We find that eligibility for the 
performance-based scholarship increased persistence by increasing enrollment probability in the 
second semester after random assignment.
3  After two years, program group students earned 3.7 
credit hours more than the control group students, an advantage of 37 percent. We also find some 
evidence that the program may have affected academic performance and effort.  
Our results are consistent with related studies that have also found positive effects of 
performance-based incentives on education outcomes in different settings. At the college level, 
Angrist, Lang, and Oreopoulos (2009) provide some evidence that incentive scholarships, 
particularly combined with counseling services, may increase academic achievement among 
female, first-year students at 4-year colleges and that these effects may persist into their second 
year. At the secondary school level, Angrist and Lavy (2009) find in Israel that cash rewards for 
high school (Bagrut) certification and intermediate milestones (for example, taking component 
tests) increased certification rates among girls by roughly 10 percentage points. They also find 
some evidence that the incentive awards increased the likelihood of subsequent post-secondary 
school enrollment. Similarly, Jackson (2010a) finds that the Advanced Placement Incentive 
Program (APIP) in Texas—which rewards students (and teachers) for AP courses and exam 
scores—increased the share of students taking AP or International Baccalaureate (IB) exams. He 
also finds some evidence that the APIP increased the shares of students scoring above 1100 on 
the SAT Reasoning Test or 24 on the ACT Test, and later evidence (see Jackson 2010b) of 
impacts on college matriculation, persistence, and grades. Finally, in a U.S. experiment at the 
elementary and 9
th grade levels Fryer (2010) finds that financial incentives rewarding students 
for education inputs such as reading books, attending school, and turning in homework increased 
                                                 
3 Early results from this study were reported in Brock and Richburg-Hayes (2006). 3 
 
test score achievement. In contrast, he finds that rewarding students for education outcomes such 
as grades and test scores led to no improvement in achievement test scores. 
This paper is also related to college-level studies looking at merit scholarships and 
student aid, more generally. The most compelling evidence on the impact of tuition (and fees) 
suggests that students who receive greater grant aid are more likely to enroll in college and to 
persist, with larger impacts among two-year college students than four-year college students (see, 
e.g., Rouse 1994, Kane 1999, Dynarski 2003, 2000, 2008). Further, Scott-Clayton (2009) finds 
that a merit scholarship combined with performance incentives tied to grades and credits earned 
(the West Virginia PROMISE program) increases credits earned and the four-year BA 
completion rate. 
We next discuss a theoretical framework for thinking about educational persistence and 
the role of incentive scholarships followed by a description of the intervention studied in section 
III. In section IV, we describe the data and present sample characteristics of program participants 
in comparison to community college students more generally. The estimation strategy and results 
are presented in Section V, and Section VI concludes. 
 
II. Theoretical  framework 
A.  Persistence and Effort 
 Following the model outlined by Becker (1967), economists typically hypothesize that 
students continue their education until the marginal cost outweighs the marginal benefit. Suppose 
that student i’s grade point average (GPA) depends on ability ai, effort ei, and some random 
noise εi as follows: 
                   .  (1) 4 
 
Let  ε be distributed, F(ε), with density f(ε), and let c(e) reflect the cost of effort. Assume 
 ′     0  and  ′′     0 . Further assume there is a payoff W for achieving a minimum GPA    
with a payoff of zero otherwise.
4 Assuming students maximize utility by maximizing the net 
expected benefit of effort, the student’s maximization problem is as follows: 
  max   1                  ·          . .     0 ,  (2)
Assuming the second order conditions are satisfied, the optimal value of effort,   
 , is 
characterized by the first-order condition: 
   ′   
              
        · .   (3)
Thus, a student may not enroll or continue in college because the marginal benefit is relatively 
low and/or because the costs are relatively high. The research evidence on whether the benefit of 
each additional year (or credit) is lower for dropouts than for students who stay in school is 
inconclusive (Barrow and Rouse, 2006), but there are many reasons to think that the costs, 
broadly construed, may differ across students.  
 
B.  Policy intervention and performance-based scholarships   
There seems to be agreement that at least some of the dropout is not optimal and many 
policy experiments aim to increase educational attainment and persistence. Traditional need-
based and merit-based scholarships provide an incentive to enroll in college, such as a reward 
payment for registration, effectively lowering the costs of enrolling in college because they are 
paid regardless of whether the student passes her classes.  Performance-based scholarships 
(PBSs) generally try to improve student outcomes by increasing the immediate financial benefits 
from school. For example, payments may be contingent on meeting benchmark performance 
                                                 
4 Alternatively, one could think about there being a payoff to each course completed with a minimum grade level. 
We also abstract from the possibility of a higher payoff to achieving grades above the minimum threshold. 5 
 
goals such as minimum GPAs. Thus the incentives can be thought of as increasing the immediate 
financial rewards to effort. Because a PBS provides more immediate financial rewards to effort, 
we would expect PBS eligible students to allocate more time to educationally productive 
activities such as studying which should in turn translate into greater educational attainment.
 5  
If the density f() in equation (3) is roughly normally distributed with small values in the 
tails, then whether and by how much a performance incentive changes an individual student’s 
effort will depend on ability and the marginal cost of effort. For a high ability student, increasing 
the payoff W will have little effect on her effort because she will essentially be able to meet the 
minimum GPA requirement on ability with no effort, i.e. ability alone puts her in the right tail of 
the density. Similarly, really low ability will put a student in the left tail of the distribution and an 
increase in W will have little effect on her effort because the probability of meeting the minimum 
GPA requirement even with high levels of effort is so low and effort is costly. For students in the 
middle range of ability, the performance incentive will cause them to increase effort in order to 
increase the probability of meeting the minimum GPA requirement. On the cost side (all else 
equal) we would expect to see students facing a higher marginal cost of effort to have a smaller 
change in effort in response to changes in the payoff W than students facing a lower marginal 
cost of effort.
6 
                                                 
5  The incentive literature makes clear that to be effective, pay for performance and other incentive-based schemes 
must be clear and with tangible consequences or rewards (e.g., Milkovich and Newman, 2002).  As a result, the 
structure of performance-based scholarships is more likely to generate changes in behavior than are others, such as 
Pell Grants, which have less clear benchmarks or have delayed consequences and rewards.  For example Pell Grants 
require that students make “satisfactory academic progress” for continued eligibility, but it does not affect a 
student’s financial aid during the semester in question.  Further, both the definition of “satisfactory academic 
progress” and the consequences of falling behind academically for Pell eligibility are determined at the institutional 
level meaning that the incentives are likely less evident to a student than an incentive structure similar to that in the 
program analyzed in this paper. 
6  We have attempted to test for such implications of the model empirically by interacting the treatment effect with 
prior background variables such as whether or not the individual had already obtained an advanced degree or 
certificate, dependency status, and the presence of a child under the age of six.  While the signs of some of the 
coefficient estimates were consistent with the model, the estimates were generally indistinguishable from zero.  
These results are available from the authors on request. 6 
 
While the intention of a performance-based scholarship is to increase student effort in 
educationally productive ways, there may be unintended consequences as well. Indeed, 
Cornwell, Lee, and Mustard (2005) find that the Georgia HOPE scholarship which had grade 
incentives but not credit incentives reduced the likelihood that students registered for a full credit 
load and increased the likelihood that students withdrew from courses presumably to increase the 
probability that they met the minimum GPA benchmark.  
  
III.  The Opening Doors Scholarship and Counseling Program 
The data analyzed were collected as part of the Opening Doors Louisiana (ODLA) study 
conducted by MDRC between 2004 and 2005 as part of a larger, multiple site demonstration 
project.  The Opening Doors demonstration was a longitudinal study that addressed two 
problems facing community colleges: 1) high rates of attrition, especially by low-income 
students; and 2) a dearth of reliable evidence on how to help students persist in community 
college to achieve long-term academic and labor market success.  
The ODLA study was implemented at three community college campuses in the New 
Orleans area -- Delgado Community College (DCC) (the City Park and West Bank Campuses) 
and Louisiana Technical College (LTC)-West Jefferson campus -- and tested the effectiveness of 
an intervention that included a scholarship with both an incentive-based component and one 
more similar to traditional merit or need-based scholarships and enhanced counseling services. 
The study targeted low-income parents who were primarily first-term students at the college 
although some continuing students ready to move from remedial/developmental-level courses to 
college-level courses were also accepted into the program.  To be eligible for the study, students 
had to be: willing to attend school at least half-time; 18 to 34 years old; the parent of at least one 7 
 
dependent child under 19 years old; and have family income below 200 percent of the federal 
poverty line. In addition, students had to have earned a high school diploma, a General 
Educational Development (GED) certificate, or a passing score on a college entrance 
examination, but they could not already have a degree or occupational certificate from an 
accredited college or university. These requirements meant that the eligible population was 
disproportionately female and poor. See Richburg-Hayes et al. (2009) for more details. 
 
A.  Recruitment and random assignment 
Students were recruited on campus over four consecutive semesters (including summer) 
from spring 2004 to spring 2005 with a sample goal of 1000 students. Once program staff 
determined eligibility for the study, students who agreed to participate provided baseline 
demographic information, completed a survey on health information, and were randomly 
assigned by MDRC to the program or control group. Everyone completing the random 
assignment process received a $20 gift card. In Table 1 we present information on the number of 
students in each cohort on each campus. In total 1019 students were recruited; 505 were 
randomly assigned to the program-eligible group and 514 were assigned to the control group. 
Not surprisingly, recruitment was most successful for the fall cohort; the spring 2005 cohort is 
unusually small simply because recruitment stopped once recruiters determined that the target 
sample would be met.  Delgado is the larger of the two institutions, and the City Park campus is 
larger than the West Bank campus generating differences in sample sizes across sites. 
 
B.  Scholarship and incentives 8 
 
The ODLA offered program-eligible students a $1000 scholarship for each of two 
semesters (maximum $2000 total) as a supplement to the Pell Grant and other financial aid 
programs. The maximum scholarship payment was generous in that it exceeded full-time tuition 
and fees at the two colleges. In 2004-05, tuition and fees were roughly $1500 per year for a full-
time student at Delgado and $900 per year for a full-time student at LTC. That said, these 
students typically had a fairly large amount of unmet need that would have to be met by working 
and/or taking out student loans.  For example, the total cost of attending Delgado (tuition, fees, 
books, and room and board) was $12,126 per year in 2004-05. With a full Pell grant of $4050, a 
student would have unmet need of more than $8000 (See Richburg-Hayes et al. (2009).). 
Scholarship payment was structured such that a student received $250 at the start of the 
semester if she enrolled at least half-time (six or more credit hours), she received $250 after 
midterms if she stayed enrolled at least half-time and maintained a C-average or better, and she 
received $500 after the end of the semester if she stayed enrolled at least half-time and 
maintained a C-average or better for the semester. Receiving payment at the end of the semester 
was not contingent on receiving the midterm payment so students with less than a C-average 
after midterms could raise their grades to qualify for the $500 payment at the end of the 
semester. Similarly, failure to qualify for payment in the first semester did not disqualify the 
student from payments in the second semester.   
  In Table 2 we present information on the number and percentage of program and control 
group students receiving scholarship payments, the distribution of the size of payments received, 
and total dollar value of the payments received in the first and second semester after random 
assignment. We also present similar information cumulatively for the first through seventh 9 
 
semester after random assignment.
 7  Eighty-four percent of program group students received one 
or more scholarship payments in the first semester, 62 percent received one or more scholarship 
payments in the second semester, and nearly 90 percent of program students received at least one 
scholarship payment over the first through seventh semester after random assignment. Roughly 
30 percent received the full $2000 scholarship over the 7 semesters after random assignment, and 
nearly 60 percent received $1000 in at least one semester. In each of the first two semesters, the 
average scholarship payment among recipients in the program group was around $750. Overall 
program group students received total scholarship payments averaging $1133. While we cannot 
measure whether program group students were mistakenly told they were not part of the 
program, we can check the number of control group students who received scholarship 
payments.  Only 3 control group students received any payment so contamination seems 
minimal.  
When asked how they used the scholarship money, 66% of respondents reported using it 
for books and school supplies and about 45% reported using it to help pay bills, buy gas or bus 
fare, and pay for child care costs.  Asked for the main use of the scholarship money, 46% of 
recipients cited to purchase books and school supplies (Richburg-Hayes, et al. 2009).  These uses 
are consistent with (successful) participants attempting to use the funds to help with educational 
expenses or basic household maintenance. 
                                                 
7 With the exception of the spring 2005 cohort, students did not have to enroll in consecutive semesters to take full 
advantage of the offer. Because the program ended in August 2005, students from the spring 2005 cohort needed to 
attend both the spring and summer 2005 semesters to receive the maximum benefit; whereas, students from the 
spring 2004 cohort, for example, had five semesters over which they could take advantage of the program. The 
incentive structure was also modified somewhat for the summer semesters at Delgado during which classes met half 
as many months but for twice as many hours each session. For the summer semesters at Delgado, program students 
were eligible for $500 at the beginning of the semester after registering at least half-time and $500 at the end of the 
semester if they stayed enrolled at least half-time and received a C-average or better. Additionally, for the final 
semester of the program (summer 2005), Delgado also allowed students a half scholarship of $500 total if they 
enrolled in a single, three-hour credit course. 10 
 
 
C.  Enhanced counseling 
MDRC had originally hoped that the counseling component would result in counselors 
getting to know students on a personal level and taking an active role in non-academic advising. 
While this may have been true for some counselors, MDRC’s study of the program 
implementation showed that the counselors more typically served as program monitors: checking 
up on students’ enrollment status, verifying grade benchmarks were achieved, meeting with 
students to explain rules, and handing out scholarship checks (Richburg-Hayes, et al. 2009). 
 
III.  Data sources and sample characteristics 
All data used in this study were compiled by MDRC and come from several sources. 
From the baseline data collected before random assignment we use basic demographic 
characteristics. Scholarship data provide information about the timing and size of the Opening 
Doors Scholarship payments. Transcript data for at least 7 semesters following random 
assignment were collected from Delgado and LTC and contain data on registration, credits 
earned, grades, and withdrawals.  Notably, the transcript data only cover semesters in attendance 
at DCC and LTC.  However, MDRC also matched the ODLA participants to National Student 
Clearinghouse (the Clearinghouse) data. The Clearinghouse data provide enrollment, degree, and 
certificate data for all students matched to any Clearinghouse reporting institution.  That said, the 
Clearinghouse coverage is not complete due to non-reporting institutions and students who opt 
out of having their data included. Importantly, LTC did not report to the Clearinghouse.  
Finally, MDRC attempted to survey all participants with a follow-up survey roughly 12 
months after random assignment; however, the follow-up survey was interrupted as a result of 11 
 
Hurricane Katrina on August 29, 2005. Ultimately 79% of the original participants completed a 
follow-up survey. Nearly half the sample (492 respondents) was surveyed before Hurricane 
Katrina, an average of 13 months after random assignment. The remaining 402 respondents were 
surveyed after Hurricane Katrina, an average of 21 months after random assignment.  From these 
follow-up data we use measures of the participants’ educational experiences, namely reports on 
time spent on campus and studying.   
Table 3 presents selected mean baseline characteristics for study participants at the time 
of random assignment. For comparison, we also present mean characteristics for a nationally 
representative sample of first-time, two-year public college students between the ages of 17 and 
34 from the U.S. Department of Education’s 2004 Beginning Postsecondary Survey (BPS) and 
for the subset of these students from Louisiana.
8 Compared with community college students 
generally or the subset of students in Louisiana, the eligibility requirements mean that study 
participants were nearly 5 years older than typical first-time community college students, more 
likely to be female (92 percent versus 57 percent of Louisiana community college students), 
more likely to be black (85 percent compared with 43 percent of Louisiana community college 
students), more likely to have children (all participants versus 22 percent), and less likely to be 
financially dependent on their parents (17 percent of study participants compared with 73 percent 
of first-time community college students). Study participants were also less well-prepared 
academically: 17 percent of study participants had a GED rather than a high school diploma 
compared with only 8 percent of community college students in the nation or Louisiana.  
As another way to understand the characteristics of the study participants compared with 
community college students more generally, we estimated the likelihood that a community 
                                                 
8 The BPS is a longitudinal study that follows students who are enrolled in a postsecondary institution for the first 
time. The most recent BPS cohort consists of approximately 19,000 students who were first interviewed in 2004 as 
part of the National Postsecondary Student Aid Study; we use data from 2004.  12 
 
college student in the BPS would complete an associate’s degree or higher and their number of 
years of schooling within six years. We then used the coefficient estimates to predict educational 
attainment for each sample.  Not surprisingly, when evaluated at the mean of the individual 
characteristics, we estimate that the students in the Opening Doors sample are about 3.5 
percentage points less likely than students in the BPS to complete at least an associate’s degree, 
and they are predicted to complete 0.18 fewer years of schooling within six years of initial 
enrollment.  In sum, the study participants were generally more likely to possess characteristics 
that are associated with an increased risk of failing to complete a college degree than the typical 
community college student in Louisiana or the nation. 
We present mean characteristics by random assignment status in the first two columns of 
Table 4. In each case the means are adjusted for randomization pool fixed effects reflecting the 
campus and cohort of study recruitment.  In the third column we present the p-value for the test 
that the adjusted mean for students assigned to the program group is equal to the adjusted mean 
for the students assigned to the control group.  Two characteristics—sex and race—are 
statistically different between the treatment and control groups at the 10 percent level of 
significance. At the 5 percent level of statistical significance, the control group is more likely to 
report race as “other” and more likely to report living in section 8 or public housing. However, 
jointly the baseline characteristics do not predict treatment status (p-value on the F-test = 0.19).
9  
 
IV.   Estimation and Results 
                                                 
9 Similarly combining baseline characteristics into an “outcome” index we find no statistically significant 
differences by treatment status (p-value = 0.532). Results for all estimates including baseline controls are similar and 
available from the authors on request. Notably, the precision of our estimates is not improved by including baseline 
controls. 13 
 
Below we present estimates of the effect of program eligibility on a variety of outcomes. 
We model each outcome Y for individual i as follows: 
                 Θ         ,          ( 4 )  
where Ti is a treatment status indicator for individual i being eligible for the program scholarship 
and enhanced counseling, Xi is a vector of baseline characteristics (which may or may not be 
included), pi is a vector of indicators for the student’s cohort and campus of random assignment, 
νi is the error term, and α, β, Θ, and γ are parameters to be estimated with β representing the 
average effect on outcome Y of being randomly assigned to be eligible for the scholarship and 
enhanced counseling services.   
A.  Program effects at the participating colleges 
In Table 5 we present estimates of the effect of program eligibility on various short-run 
outcomes measured by transcript data provided by DCC and LTC. In column (1) we provide 
outcome means for the control group participants. The program effect estimates with standard 
errors in column (2) are estimated including controls for randomization pool fixed effects but no 
other baseline characteristics. Because we provide estimates for a number of related outcomes, in 
column (3) we present p-values adjusted for multiple testing.
10  
The top panel of Table 5 includes transcript outcome measures for the first semester after 
random assignment. We find that program-eligible students were 5 percentage points more likely 
to be enrolled in any course at the intervention institution after the end of the drop/add period; 
however, the impact does not remain statistically significant at the 5 percent level after adjusting 
                                                 
10 We calculate adjusted p-values using bootstrap resampling of vectors in a stepdown fashion following Westfall 
and Young (1993). In Table 5 we adjust the p-values considering the group of outcomes within semester. 14 
 
for multiple testing.
11 We find that program-eligible students attempted and earned more credits 
as well.  In fact, program group students earned roughly 1.2 credits more than control group 
students in the first semester (a difference that is significant at the 5% level once adjusting for 
multiple testing).  Notably, this impact is mostly explained by gains in regular credits attempted 
and earned (rather than remedial credits).  In order to receive any scholarship payment, students 
were required to register for at least 6 credits. In results not reported (here but available on 
request), while program eligible students were less likely to be enrolled less than half time (1 to 5 
credits) and more likely to be enrolled either part-time (6 to 11 credits) or full-time (a minimum 
of 12 credits), the differences are not statistically significant. Overall, if we create an index of the 
first semester outcomes as in Anderson (2008) we find a statistically significant difference 
between treatment and control students (p-value = 0.022).
12 
We present program effect estimates for outcomes in the second semester after random 
assignment in the bottom panel of Table 5.  Here we find that program eligibility increased 
persistence: program-eligible students were 15 percentage points more likely to have enrolled in 
any course after the second semester drop/add period with an adjusted p-value<0.0001. This 
strong effect on enrollment generates several other statistically significant differences because, 
for example, one cannot earn credits without enrolling. Program group students attempted 1.2 
credits more than control group students and by the end of the second semester had earned 1.1 
more credit hours, 40 percent more than the control group students.  
Such increases in credit accumulation can be decomposed into two impacts:  an impact of 
the program on enrollment and an impact of the program on credits attempted/earned conditional 
                                                 
11 The “drop/add” period is the period at the beginning of the semester during which students may elect to add or 
drop a course for which they had initially registered. It typically ended 5 days after the start of the semester. 
12 The index includes all semester 1 outcomes presented in Table 5 as well as the indicators for full-time and part-
time status discussed in the text. In creating these indices, we weighted by the inverse of the covariance matrix.  15 
 
on enrollment.  Following Lavy (2009), one can write the average number of credits earned or 
attempted by students in group i as: 
     
     1        
         ( 5 )  
 
where Pi is the share of students registering that semester, Yi
1 is the number of credits earned or 
attempted by students registering and Yi
0 is the number of credits earned or attempted by students 
not registering. By assumption, credits attempted and credits earned equal zero among students 
who do not register so the average expected number of credits earned/attempted for group i is 
PiYi
1. The average treatment effect is P1Y1
1- P0Y0
1 where group 1 is the program group and group 




1).  The first term represents the portion of the unconditional increase that is due to the impact 
of the program on the likelihood of enrollment while the second represents the increase in credits 
attempted or earned conditional on enrollment.
13 We estimate that all of the unconditional 
increase in credits attempted in the second semester is due to an increase in the likelihood of 
enrollment while for credits earned in the second semester, 27 percent of the increase is due to 
the increase in credits earned conditional on enrollment.
14 
Once again, program group students do not seem to be shifting credits disproportionately 
toward remedial courses. We also find (in results not reported here) that program group students 
were 12.2 percentage points more likely to enroll part-time, but there is no statistical difference 
                                                 
13 To do this calculation, we estimate the ATE components separately by randomization pool. Specifically, we 
calculate the weighted average of each component for the 11 pools where the weights are the share of the students in 
each pool. To estimate the share of the impact resulting from enrollment, we divide the weighted average of this 
component by the weighted average of the ATE. 
14 In the first semester when the program effect on registration is smaller, we estimate that 86 percent of the increase 
in credits attempted is due to the increased enrollment while for credits earned 71 percent of the increase is due to 
the increase in credits earned conditional on enrollment. 16 
 
in the percentage enrolled full-time or less than half time. Once again, an index of second 
semester outcomes is statistically different between treatment and control group students with a 
p-value < 0.001.
15 
B.  Longer-run outcomes and effects on enrollment at “all” institutions 
  In order to consider longer-run outcomes for program and control group students, we 
focus on the first two cohorts of students for whom we observe the greatest number of semesters 
of potential study both before and after Hurricane Katrina.
16 Limiting the sample to these first 
two cohorts, in the first column of Table 6 we present estimates for longer run outcomes based 
on transcript data. Outcomes related to enrollment are presented in the top panel while outcomes 
related to credits earned are presented in the bottom panel. During the first year after random 
assignment, a student could have enrolled for up to 3 semesters and earned at least 36 credits if 
she had enrolled full-time (12 or more credits) in each semester. While program group students 
were (statistically) no more likely to be enrolled in any course in the first semester after random 
assignment, they were 18 percentage points more likely to be enrolled in the second semester and 
nearly 12 percentage points more likely to be enrolled in the third semester.  Cumulatively the 
program students were enrolled for 0.35 more semesters than the control group at the 
intervention campus in the first year.  In the second year after random assignment, we find that 
program students had enrolled for 0.13 more semesters than the control group students and that 
cumulatively after two years the program group had enrolled for nearly 0.5 more semesters. 
                                                 
15 The index includes all semester 2 outcomes reported in Table 5 as well as indictors for full-time and part-time 
enrollment. 
16 Program impact estimates for outcomes presented in Table 5 are quite similar if we limit the sample to the first 
two cohorts of students. These results are available from the authors on request. 17 
 
In the bottom panel, we present results on total credits earned.  After the first year, 
students in the program group had earned 3.3 more credits (or roughly one-quarter of one full-
time semester’s worth of credits) and nearly 45 percent greater than the number of credits earned 
by the control group. In the second year after random assignment (semesters 4, 5, and 6), we find 
no statistically significant difference in the total number of credits earned; however, the positive 
point estimate indicates that control group students were not catching up to program group 
students over a longer time horizon.
17 Two years after random assignment, program group 
students had enrolled nearly one-half of one semester more than control group students and 
earned an additional 3.7 credits. 
  While program eligibility increased persistence and the number of credits earned as 
shown above, these reflect outcomes at the intervention campus.  Clearly control group students 
had less incentive to stay at the intervention campus if they decided that a different campus 
would be a better match. As a result, one might expect that our estimates of the program’s impact 
are biased upward.  In order to examine this possibility, we supplement our transcript data with 
those available from the National Student Clearinghouse in order to include education outcomes 
at other institutions. As mentioned in the data discussion, these Clearinghouse data are not ideal 
because not all institutions report to the Clearinghouse, and students may decline to have their 
information included. In particular, LTC does not report to the Clearinghouse.
18 Therefore, we 
report results for all study participants as well as the sub-sample of participants who were 
                                                 




after random assignment separately.  While the point estimates are positive (reinforcing the likelihood that the 
control group students were not catching up to the program group students), the magnitudes were not statistically 
significant at conventional levels.  These results are available on request. 
18 MDRC was able to match nearly 80 percent of participants with a record in the Clearinghouse data. Of the 
participants not matched with a Clearinghouse record, 71 percent were from a cohort recruited at LTC. 18 
 
recruited on either of the DCC campuses. These results are presented in the remaining columns 
of Table 6. 
  In column (2) of Table 6 we supplement the transcript data provided by the institutions 
with data from the Clearinghouse.  The results are roughly similar to those presented in column 
(1) with the largest impacts in the percentage of students enrolled in any course in the second and 
third semesters after random assignment. Program-eligible students also enrolled for roughly 
one-third more semesters in the first year following random assignment.  
Columns (3) and (4) limit the sample to students recruited at the Delgado campuses since 
Delgado reports to the Clearinghouse. Using Delgado transcript data, the estimated program 
effects are somewhat larger than the transcript data estimates presented in column (1) which 
include LTC recruits. Using Clearinghouse data for the Delgado campuses only, we find that 
program-eligible students were 18.8 percentage points more likely to enroll in the second 
semester and 15.2 percentage points more likely to enroll in the third semesters after random 
assignment.  Over the first year, program-eligible students enrolled in 0.40 more semesters than 
control group students; over two years, program-eligible students enrolled in 0.52 more 
semesters than control group students. 
  Overall the Table 6 results suggest that the program increases enrollment persistence and 
educational attainment rather than simply encouraging program students to maintain enrollment 
and earn credits at a particular institution in the short run.  If the scholarship served only to 
encourage program group students to stay at the intervention campus while control group 
students enrolled at other campuses, then we would have expected to see no difference between 
treatment and control students in second and third semester enrollments once we accounted for 19 
 
enrollment at all campuses reporting to the Clearinghouse.  Indeed, including data on enrollment 
from the Clearinghouse data reduces the point estimate of the program effect on second semester 




C.  Does program eligibility affect the types of courses taken? 
One unintended consequence of the incentive-based scholarship may have been to affect 
the types of courses for which students registered.  We have shown in Table 5 that program 
group students did not reduce the number of total credits attempted and program and control 
group students did not differ in the number of remedial credits attempted. However, program 
group students may have attempted to register for “easier” courses in order to increase the 
probability that they would be able to meet the minimum semester GPA of 2.0 to qualify for the 
mid-semester and end-of-semester scholarship payments. While we do not have direct 
information about the difficulty of different courses offered, we do have information about the 
“fields” of the courses taken and can assess whether program and control group students took 
different numbers of credits in different fields. 
Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan (2005) find that among displaced workers, earnings 
gains per credit are larger for quantitative or technically-oriented courses than for non-technical 
courses. Similarly, Jacobson and Mohker (2009) find that additional courses in health-related 
                                                 
19 Ideally, we would also like to use these data to examine long run outcomes such as certificate and degree receipt. 
Unfortunately, because these students are not typically enrolled full-time and because we have Clearinghouse data 
only up through two years after random assignment, we observe very few students completing degree or certification 
requirements. Only 12 of the original Delgado students show up as having received a certificate or degree: 6 have 
received a certificate, 5 received an Associates’ degree, and 1 received a Masters’ degree. 
 20 
 
fields are the most valuable followed by vocational/technical courses, professional courses, and 
courses in the science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) cluster. They find no 
statistically significant value of additional courses in social sciences or humanities. If we assume 
monetary returns to courses are higher for more difficult courses, we can infer whether the 
program induced students to take easier courses by looking at the estimated program effects on 
credits attempted by field. Shifts in course-taking away from health-related, vocational/technical, 
STEM, and professional courses toward courses in the social sciences and humanities would 
provide evidence the program may have induced students to take easier courses.
20  
We follow Jacobson and Mohker (2009) in assigning each course to one of eight 
categories—Health Related; Humanities; Professional; STEM; Social Sciences; 
Vocational/Technical; Remedial; or Other. See Appendix A for more detail. In column (1) of 
Table 7, we present the cumulative average number of credits attempted by field for the control 
group students in the first two semesters after random assignment. This ranges from 0.22 credits 
in the Vocational/Technical field to 4.17 credits in STEM courses (column (1)). We then use the 
(cumulative) number of credits attempted in each field as an outcome variable and present the 
program effect estimates for each field in column (2).  If scholarship eligibility does not affect 
the fields of courses taken and those induced by the program to register take a similar 
distribution of classes to those who would have registered anyway, then we would expect to find 
increases in the number of credits attempted between treatment and control group students for all 
fields.  As can be seen in column (2), all program effect estimates are positive, but only the 
program impact of 0.41 credits attempted in social sciences can be rejected at the 5 percent level 
                                                 
20 We note, however, that this prediction is not entirely clean because changes in the pattern of course-taking may 
occur instead because those students induced by the program to enroll take courses in different fields than those who 
would have enrolled anyway. 21 
 
after adjusting for multiple testing, providing some evidence that the performance-based 
scholarship induced eligible students to register for easier courses, on average.
 21 
The results are less clear, however, when we focus on the types of credits earned, the 
results of which are presented in columns (3) and (4). Average credits earned by field for the 
control group students are presented in column (3) and range from 0.16 credits in the 
vocational/technical field to 2.38 credits earned in STEM. In column (4) we present the 
associated program effect estimates.  Once again we find that the program impact on credits 
earned is positive for each field. Further, program group students earn an additional 0.654 STEM 
credits (adjusted p-value = 0.018) and 0.412 social science credits (adjusted p-value = 0.002) 
than control group students; no other differences in credits earned by field are statistically 
different from zero at conventional levels after adjusting for multiple testing. While Social 
Sciences are likely to be “easier” classes as measured by the average earnings effect per course 
taken, by this same measure STEM classes are likely to be “harder” classes. Thus, we conclude 
that there is little evidence that the program resulted in students earning relatively more credits in 
“easier” courses as measured by their value in terms of future earnings.
22 
 
D.  Does program eligibility increase academic performance and effort? 
Clearly enrolling in school requires more educational effort than not enrolling. However,  
the fact that program eligibility increased the number of credits earned in the first semester after 
random assignment and that 27 percent of the increase in second semester credits earned is due 
                                                 
21 If we simply categorize courses as “hard”—Health Related, Professional, STEM, and Vocational/Technical—or 
“easy”—Humanities, Social Sciences, Remedial, and Other—we find that the program effect on credits attempted is 
0.81 credits for hard courses (adjusted p-value = 0.229) and 0.93 credits for easy courses (adjusted p-value=0.051).  
Adjusted p-values are calculated taking into consideration all credits attempted and credits earned outcomes tested in 
Table 7 in addition to the aggregate easy and hard categories. 
22 Again if we simply categorize courses as hard or easy (see footnote 21) we find program effect estimates of 1.183 
more hard credits and 1.124 more easy credits in the first two semesters after random assignment. Both are 
statistically different from zero after adjusting for multiple testing.  22 
 
to an increase in credits earned conditional on enrollment suggest that program eligibility may 
have had an impact on student effort for a student who would have enrolled regardless of 
scholarship eligibility.  To look for evidence of a program effect on academic performance and 
effort more directly, we turn to estimates of the effect of program eligibility on course grades, 
term GPA, hours spent on campus, and hours spent studying.  
Because not all courses result in a letter grade, we begin by simply looking at the 
distribution of course grades by treatment status. These are presented in Figures 1a and 1b, 
respectively, for the first and second semesters after random assignment. For each group the bars 
represent the percent of courses earning that grade. Looking at the letter grades for the first 
semester on the left hand side of figure 1a, we can see that students in the program group earn 
somewhat higher shares of grades “A,” “B,” and “C.” Specifically, 53 percent of courses taken 
by control group students resulted in a grade of A, B, or C compared with 62 percent of courses 
taken by students in the program group. In contrast, 14 percent of courses taken by students in 
the control group resulted in a grade of “F” compared with 9.5 percent of courses taken by 
students in the program group.  Looking at the “ungraded” course outcomes, nearly 21 percent of 
courses taken by control group students resulted in a withdrawal compared with 15 percent of 
courses taken by program group students. Indeed, a simple chi-squared test for independence of 
treatment status and course grade category has a p-value of 0.000. 
In the second semester of the program, the grade distributions look more similar although 
the distributions are still statistically different with the p-value on the chi-squared test for 
independence of treatment status and course grade category equal to 0.021. Grades of A, B, and 
C are more common among courses taken by program group students (57 percent of course 
grades for program group students versus 51 percent of course grades for control group 23 
 
students). Courses taken by program group students are somewhat less likely to end up with a 
grade of F and less likely to end up as a withdrawal.
23 
The grade distributions in Figure 1, particularly for the first semester in which there is a 
smaller program effect on registration, suggest that indeed program eligibility improved 
students’ academic outcomes for both graded and ungraded course outcomes. MDRC calculated 
term GPAs from the transcript data for students who enrolled. Using indicators for “GPA greater 
than or equal to 2.0” and “no GPA,” we find that 58 percent of program group students earn a 
GPA of 2.0 or higher in the first semester compared to 47 percent of control group students, a 
difference that is statistically significant at the 1 percent level after adjusting for multiple testing. 
Program group students are 7.7 percentage points less likely to have no GPA with an adjusted p-
value of 0.11. These differences are even larger in the second semester after random assignment 
because program eligibility has such a large effect on enrollment. Thus, we look at upper and 
lower bound estimates of the effect of program eligibility on term GPAs and other measures of 
effort based on survey responses using assumptions about selection.   
In addition, the MDRC follow-up survey includes two questions that may be used to 
assess whether the program affected hours spent on campus and hours spent studying in the first 
and second semester. For the survey questions on hours spent on campus, the potential response 
categories are: none, 1 to 3, 4 to 6, 7 to 9, 10 to 12, and more than 12.  For the survey questions 
on hours spent studying, the potential response categories are: none, 1 to 3, 4 to 6, 7 to 9, 10 to 
12, 13 to 15, 16 to 18, and more than 18 hours.  We convert the responses to continuous 
measures using the midpoint of the range and assigning 15 hours to respondents who report more 
than 12 hours per week on campus and 20 hours to respondents reporting more than 18 hours per 
                                                 
23 Eleven percent of program group courses receive a grade of F and 22 percent ended up with a withdrawal. In 




24  Students who report not being enrolled in the intervention school that 
semester are assigned missing hours for both activities. 
In Table 8, column (2) we present estimates of how program eligibility affected term 
GPA and effort ignoring the selection effect.  Because program eligibility affects the probability 
that a student is enrolled in school, it also affects whether we observe GPA as well as our 
measures of effort—hours spent on campus and hours spent studying. Furthermore, observations 
on hours spent on campus and studying are limited to follow-up survey respondents. As a result, 
we follow the trimming strategy of Lee (2009) in estimating upper and lower bounds of 
treatment effects in the presence of sample selection.
25,26  Namely, we trim the top or bottom 
“excess” share of observations from the treatment group (assuming treatment increased 
registration) and compare this trimmed mean to the control group mean in order to generate the 
lower and upper bound estimates of the effect of program eligibility on the outcome of interest.  
These lower and upper bound estimates are presented in columns (3) and (4).  Once again 
the mean of the outcome variable for the control group is presented in column (1).
27 Ignoring 
selection, program eligibility raised first semester GPA by 0.18 points. The lower bound estimate 
                                                 
24 We have also tried converting to continuous measures using the minimum or maximum of the range. The results 
for hours spent studying are quite similar to those using the midpoint assumption. For hours spent on campus, the 
lower bound estimates are also insensitive to the interpolation assumption. The upper bound estimates for the effect 
of the program on hours on campus are somewhat more sensitive to the assumption ranging from 0.31 to 0.70 hours 
in the first semester and ranging from 1.2 to 2.1 hours in the second semester. 
25 In our particular application, we trim the sample within randomization pool and then calculate the weighted mean 
of the separate estimates to get the overall estimates of the bounds. 
26 An alternative strategy is to assume that the students not enrolling would have had GPAs or hours of effort at the 
bottom of the distribution and then artificially censor the data and estimate Tobit regressions as in Angrist, 
Bettinger, and Kremer (2006). One could also make similar assumptions and estimate quantile regressions looking 
for treatment effects in the upper quantiles of the distributions. If we do the latter for GPA effects, we estimate a 
0.13 grade point effect on GPA at the median in the first semester (median control group GPA=2.0) and no effect at 
the 75
th percentile (control group GPA=3.0). In the second semester we find no effect at the median (control group 
GPA of 0.0) and a 0.5 grade point effect on GPA at the 75
th percentile (control group GPA=2.29). Using the strategy 
of Angrist, Bettinger, and Kremer (2006) we generally get somewhat larger estimates although the estimates are 
sensitive to the choice of the artificial censoring points. 
27 If we control for student baseline characteristics for the outcomes presented in table 8, the treatment impacts are 
generally somewhat larger. For example, the estimated impact on first semester GPA rises to 0.24 with a standard 
error of 0.084. With the exception of hours spent on campus during the second semester, all other point estimates 
rise as well, but none are large enough to become statistically different from zero at conventional levels. 25 
 
is 0.04 points and the upper bound estimate is 0.38 points. The estimated impact on second 
semester GPA is smaller. Ignoring selection, program-eligible students had second semester 
GPAs that were 0.07 points higher than control group students. The lower bound estimated 
impact is -0.23 points, and the upper bound estimate is 0.36 points.
28 
We assume that students’ decisions about whether to enroll are driven by expectations 
about their own ability and that their expectations are correct on average (following the literature 
on dropout decisions and students’ learning about their own ability to acquire human capital (See 
Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner (2009) and Trachter (2009).).  As a result, we expect those 
induced by the program to enroll in college will, on average, be drawn from the bottom of the 
potential GPA distribution. This seems most compelling for the second semester after random 
assignment when most students have experienced a semester’s worth of information about their 
own ability. Indeed conditional on registering for the first semester, first semester GPA is a 
significant predictor of registering second semester. This argument is somewhat less compelling 
for the first semester in which students presumably have received no new information about their 
ability to acquire human capital between being inducted into the study and enrolling in classes. 
As a result, 0.18 GPA points is our preferred estimate of the effect of program eligibility on 
student GPA in the first semester after random assignment.
29  
In the second semester after random assignment we believe the selection mechanism is 
operating such that those induced by the program to persist are coming from the bottom of the 
potential GPA distribution. As a result, our preferred estimate of the effect of program eligibility 
                                                 
28 If the students induced by the program to earn a GPA earned the lowest GPAs among the program group students 
(in other words those induced to earn a GPA are the students who are trimmed from the program group) then the 
upper bound estimate of the effect of the program on GPA is the correct estimate of the effect of the program on 
GPA among students who would have earned a GPA in the absence of the program. Likewise, the lower bound 
estimate is the correct estimate if the students induced by the program to earn a GPA earned the highest GPAs 
among the program group students. 
29 If we instead assume all students with missing GPAs earned a 4.0, for example, the point estimate of the treatment 
effect is still positive. 26 
 
on term GPA in the second semester is between 0.07 and the upper bound estimate of 0.36. In 
fact, if we impute second semester GPAs equal to first semester GPAs for students without a 
second semester GPA our estimate of the effect of program eligibility on second semester GPA 
equals 0.148 grade points with a standard error of (0.092).
30 Thus, we conclude that program 
eligibility induced or enabled students to put more effort toward their courses resulting in 
somewhat higher semester GPAs. 
When we examine the first semester survey outcomes—hours spent on campus and hours 
spent studying—we find at most small effects of program eligibility on student effort on these 
margins, and the point estimates are not statistically different from zero. On average in the first 
semester, program-eligible students report having spent 0.07 more hours on campus and 0.12 
more hours studying than students in the control group. The lower and upper bounds for the 
effect estimates are -0.15 and 0.44 for hours on campus and -0.6 and 0.6 for hours studying. 
Even if we think the upper bound estimates are the more realistic point estimates, program 
eligibility only increased studying and time on campus by about 30 minutes per week, roughly a 
5 percent increase at the control group mean.   
The estimated program impacts are larger for the second semester (as are the standard 
errors).  On average, program eligible students report having spent 0.48 more hours on campus 
during the second semester and 0.68 more hours studying.  Bounds on estimates for hours spent 
on campus and studying in the second semester are also larger and include negative values. That 
said, if we believe the upper bound estimates are more realistic, the estimated effects on hours 
spent on campus and studying are closer to 90 additional minutes per week for each, a 25 percent 
increase in time on campus at the control group mean and a 40 percent increase in time spent 
studying at the control group mean.  While the likely direction of selection is difficult to assert, 
                                                 
30 The point estimate is driven to zero if we impute a second semester GPA of 2.6 for all students missing GPAs. 27 
 
we believe the (positive) upper bound estimate is closer to the “truth” than the (negative) lower 
bound estimate.  We draw this conclusion because empirically we find that first semester hours 
spent studying and on campus for control group students who enroll in both the first and second 
semester are higher than first semester hours spent on campus and studying for control group 
students who enroll in the first but not the second semester.  As in theory the control group 
represents the counterfactual for the program group, this finding suggests that the program group 
students who were induced to enroll in the second semester as a result of the program come from 
the bottom of the distributions of hours studied and on campus as assumed in the calculation of 
the upper bound. As a result, we believe the results provide suggestive evidence that program 
eligibility had positive effects on hours spent on campus and studying during the second 
semester after random assignment and that the correct estimates are somewhere between the 
average and upper bound estimates. 
 
V.   Conclusion 
We evaluate the effect of eligibility for a performance-based scholarship combined with 
counseling on education outcomes for low-income community college students who are also 
parents. We find evidence that the program increased student enrollment persistence and may 
have increased student effort. In particular, program eligibility increased enrollment by 15 to 18 
percentage points relative to control group enrollment in the second semester after random 
assignment.   
The program also may have affected academic performance and effort. First semester 
GPAs for program group students were 0.18 points higher than first semester GPAs for control 28 
 
group students. Assuming those induced to register in the second semester have lower GPAs on 
average, the program effect on GPA ranges between 0.07 and 0.36 GPA points. We find little 
evidence of a program effect on effort in the first semester as measured by time on campus or 
time spent studying. In the second semester, the upper bound estimates of the effect on time 
spent on campus and time spent studying are increases of 25 and 40 percent, respectively. 
Over two years following random assignment, program group students earned 3.69 
credits more than control group students. This translates into an additional 1.23 courses. Based 
on data from Florida, Jacobson and Mokher (2009) estimate that for a student beginning at a 
two-year college, each course completed is worth an additional $121 per year in annual earnings, 
similar to estimates for displaced workers from Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan (2005).
31 
Assuming this value stays constant in real terms, over 20 years 1.23 additional courses is worth 
$2977.  The cost of this gain in terms of scholarship payments was roughly $1100 per pupil. As 
long as the administrative and other costs were less than $1877 per pupil, which seems quite 
likely, the benefits of this program in terms of increased future income would seem to outweigh 
the cost of providing the scholarship. 
That said, we have no longer-term information on wages in order to say that inducing 
these particular students to persist and earn more credits resulted in higher future earnings.  The 
scholarship itself was fairly valuable in terms of hourly wages. At baseline, MDRC collected 
information on whether students were currently employed and if so, their current wage. Just over 
                                                 
31 This estimate corresponds to the last two columns of the Results for Regression Models table in Appendix 4 of 
Jacobson and Mohker (2009) and is based on a regression of quarterly earnings on highest credential received 
(certificate, AA, BA, or graduate degree); total number of courses taken; and controls for educational preparation 
and performance, student demographics, experience, location, and school characteristics. For our purposes, the 
authors provided estimates that limited the sample to students beginning their post-secondary education at a two-
year college and do not include concentration indicators. If the sample is limited to students beginning at a four-year 
college, each course is worth $216 per year. Estimates from Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan (2005) (Table 3, 
column (6)) imply that women’s earnings increased $101 per year (1995$) per course (3 credits) completed which 
translates into a 13.1 percent return for one academic year’s worth of credits (9 courses). 29 
 
50 percent of the study participants were currently employed at baseline (52 percent of the 
control group and 51 percent of the treatment group), and of those 86 percent were paid on an 
hourly basis.  The average wage among those employed hourly was $7.32 with a median wage of 
$7.00. At $7.32 per hour, a student would have to work 102.5 hours over the semester to earn 
$750 or roughly 7 hours per week over a 15 week semester. Assuming students were planning to 
devote some hours to school without the PBS, for many an additional 4 or 5 hours of studying to 
meet the GPA benchmarks may have been a better paying job than their alternative.  
This study leaves open several questions about how this program or any other 
performance-based scholarship may affect educational outcomes. Angrist, Lang, and Oreopoulos 
(2009) find some effects of a performance-based scholarship on academic achievement in a more 
traditional college setting, but these impacts are driven by female students. Given that the 
Opening Doors Louisiana participants are predominantly women, the question remains whether 
performance-based scholarships can improve academic outcomes for men.  Furthermore, one 
would hope that performance-based scholarships would have an effect because they enable or 
encourage students to spend more time in educationally productive activities such as studying. 
Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner (2003) provide evidence that hours working while in school 
have a negative effect on academic performance. Therefore, scholarships for nontraditional 
students such as those in the Opening Doors study may enable students to decrease hours worked 
and increase time on educational activities and subsequently increase academic achievement. At 
the same time, such scholarships may have less desirable consequences. While we did not find 
much evidence that scholarship eligibility changed students’ course-taking behavior, it is 
possible that performance-based scholarships may increase effort in ways that are not 
educationally productive such as cheating or harassing professors for better grades.  30 
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  We follow Jacobson and Mokher (2009) and classify courses into eight broad 
categories—Health Related; Humanities; Professional; Science, Technology, Engineering, and 
Mathematics (STEM); Social Sciences; Vocational/Technical; Remedial; and Other.  All courses 
are categorized based on their “discipline” code which loosely corresponds to an academic 
department rather than categorizing classes based on the course title itself.   
In Table A we list each course prefix and the associated department, academic area, or 
program description by the field in which we categorized them. In a few cases we had to use 
information about individual course descriptions, course catalogs, syllabi, and/or online college 
brochures in order to make a decision on field categorization.  As described more fully below, 
DSPE courses are placed in the Health Related field; HNRS courses are placed in the Humanities 
field; CISX and ENSC courses were placed in the STEM field; ELAP, ETRN, IDEL, and PWEL 
courses were placed in the Vocational/Technical field, and SPWF courses were placed in the 
“Other” field category. 
  Courses at DCC in the “Direct Support Professional” program, prefix DSPE, are placed 
in the Health Related field because they are in the Allied Health Division at the City Park 
Campus. The “Honors” courses at Delgado Community College—those with the prefix HNRS—
were placed in the “Humanities” field based on course titles and descriptions in the 2005-06 
catalog. Two of the course titles were Literature and Medicine and Activism and Change. 
Modernism in the Arts (HUMA 220) is listed under the honors section of the 2005-06 catalog so 
we assume that this is the same course as HNRS 220. 34 
 
  An online brochure from LTC describes CISX 1000 as an introduction to information 
systems so the CISX courses were placed in the STEM field. At other colleges ENSC courses are 
in environmental science so we assume that this is true at LTC as well, and these courses are also 
placed in STEM. An online syllabus from LTC describes ELAP 1400 as “basic electricity marine 
application” so we place the ELAP courses in the Vocational/Technical field. Online brochures 
from LTC describe ETRN courses as having to do with alternating and direct current circuits and 
IDEL courses as electronics electives so courses with both prefixes are placed in the 
Vocational/Technical field. Finally, an online LTC syllabus describes PWEL 1130 as Training 
and Testing Pipe GTAW (Cu.Ni) so courses with the PWEL prefix are also placed in the 
Vocational/Technical field. 
We were unable to decipher what program is described by the SPWF prefix so these few 
courses at DCC were placed in the Other category. 

















































































































































































Spring 2004  172 45 72 289 
Summer 2004  133 72 43 248 
Fall 2004  246 91 48 385 
Spring 2005  58 0 39 97 
All cohorts  609 208 202 1019 
 













































   (1)   (2)  (3)
Age (years)  25.293   20.591  20.947
     Share age 17‐18  0.041 0.391  0.183
     Share age 19‐20  0.138 0.334  0.499
     Share age 21‐35  0.819 0.276  0.318
Female  0.924   0.542  0.568
Race/ethnicity shares    
     Hispanic  0.026   0.157  0.097
     Black  0.849 0.137  0.432
    Asian  0.004 0.047  0.067
    American Indian  0.005 0.007  0.000
    Other (non white)  0.004   0.045  0.044
Children    
Has any children  1 0.155  0.222
Has child under 6 (conditional on any) 0.806   0.714  0.623
Number of children (conditional on any) 1.813   1.919  1.607
Average household size  3.655 3.690  3.927
Financially dependent on parents  0.172 0.727  0.732
Education    
Highest grade completed (years)  11.714   
Years since high school   6.598 2.065  2.181
Completed any college courses  0.337 0.149  0.069
Enrolled to complete certificate program 0.135 0.134  0.215
Enrolled to transfer to 4 year college  0.155 0.420  0.245
Highest degree completed    
GED  0.169 0.082  0.083
High school diploma  0.697 0.867  0.903
Technical certificate, associate's degree 
or higher  0.103 0.006  0.023
First member of family to attend college 0.426 0.322  0.277
US citizen  0.990 0.925  0.986
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Table 4: Randomization of Program and Control Groups
        








Female %  91.0 93.8 0.09  1019
Age (years)  25.2 25.3 0.69  1019
Marital status %      
Married, living w/ spouse  8.8 7.6 0.47  1003
Married, not living w/ spouse  11.0 10.5 0.81  1003
Unmarried, living w/ partner  5.2 7.5 0.14  1003
Unmarried, not living w/ partner  75.0 74.4 0.83  1003
Race/ethnicity
a %      
Hispanic  3.0 2.2 0.44  985
Black  86.9 82.8 0.07  985
White  8.6 12.3 0.06  985
Asian  0.2 0.6 0.31  985
Multi‐racial  0.8 0.6 0.70  985
Other  0.0 0.8 0.05  985
Number of children  1.8 1.9 0.21  1014
Age of youngest child (years)  3.1 3.2 0.66  1000
Receiving any government benefit %  72.4 69.5 0.31  1015
Unemployment insurance  5.1 3.8 0.32  996
Household receiving SSI  14.2 12.2 0.35  996
Household receiving TANF  10.5 10.1 0.84  996
Household receiving food stamps  61.7 62.0 0.94  996
Public housing or section 8 housing  15.3 20.6 0.04  901
Financially dependent on parents %  17.6 16.8 0.71  1006
Ever employed %  98.0 97.5 0.56  1014
Currently employed %  51.0 52.2 0.70  1017
Earned HS diploma %  70.7 68.7 0.49  1016
Earned GED %  15.2 18.6 0.15  1016
Earned tech certificate %  10.7 10.0 0.69  1016
Main reason for enrolling in college
b %     
Complete certificate program  12.7 14.4 0.43  1005
Obtain AA  57.5 55.1 0.43  1005
Transfer to 4‐yr college  15.9 15.2 0.76  1005
Obtain job skills  12.3 14.3 0.34  1005
Other reason  6.1 6.1 1.00  1005
Completed any college courses before RA % 32.8 34.6 0.54  993
First family member to attend college % 42.8 42.5 0.93  976


















  (1) (2) (3)
First semester after random assignment      
Enrolled in any course (%)   76.654 5.346  0.070
   (2.294)   
Total credits attempted  7.99 0.557  0.129
   (0.279)   
Regular credits attempted  5.101 0.497  0.129
   (0.254)   
Total credits earned  4.609 1.222  <0.0001
   (0.285)   
Regular credits earned  3.113 0.934  0.001
   (0.242)   
Second semester after random assignment     
Enrolled in any course (%)   49.611 14.956  <0.0001
    (2.849)   
Total credits attempted  4.93 1.234  0.0001
    (0.300)   
Regular credits attempted  3.547 0.913  0.001
    (0.258)   
Total credits earned  2.77 1.126  <0.0001
    (0.265)   
Regular credits earned  2.111 0.854  0.001
    (0.232)   
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Table 6:  Longer Run Outcomes and Effects on Enrollment at "All" Institutions: First Two Cohorts




















4.681 5.062 5.662  5.662
(3.470) (3.459) (3.755)  (3.755)
  [0.172] [0.149] [0.154]  [0.154]
Registered for any course in 
2nd semester 
18.142 17.553 19.229  18.798
(3.997) (4.000) (4.636)  (4.593)
  [<0.0001] [<0.0001] [0.0004]  [0.0004]
Registered for any course in 
3rd semester 
11.789 12.420 14.685  15.213
(4.041) (4.140) (4.815)  (4.793)
  [0.008] [0.007] [0.005]  [0.004]
Number of semesters enrolled 
in any course in 1st year  
0.346 0.350 0.396  0.397
(0.088) (0.088) (0.102)  (0.101)
  [0.001] [0.001] [0.0006]  [0.0006]
Number of semesters enrolled 
in any course in second year 
0.125 0.120 0.151  0.120
(0.065) (0.075) (0.076)  (0.080)
  [0.234] [0.400] [0.223]  [0.459]
Number of semesters enrolled 
in any course over first 2 years 
0.471 0.471 0.547  0.517
(0.129) (0.137) (0.149)  (0.150)
  [0.003] [0.005] [0.005]  [0.005]
Total credits earned      
Total credits earned in first 
year  3.345   4.016   
  (0.849)   (0.977)   
  [0.001]   [0.0004]   
Total credits earned in second 
year  0.343   0.402   
  (0.456)   (0.485)   
  [0.676]   [0.747]   
Total credits earned over first 2 
years  3.688   4.417   
  (1.180)   (1.313)   
  [0.013]   [0.006]   
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Table 7. Credits Attempted and Earned by Course Subject Field: All Cohorts 
         












   (1) (2)   (3)  (4)
First and second semesters after 
random assignment         
Health Related  1.587 0.063   1.012  0.146
   (0.262)    (0.231)
   [0.809]    [0.768]
Humanities  3.101 0.159   1.673  0.372
   (0.179)    (0.167)
   [0.768]    [0.246]
Professional  0.507 0.133   0.314  0.143
   (0.124)    (0.103)
   [0.768]    [0.586]
Science, Technology, Engineering, 
& Mathematics (STEM) 
4.173 0.354   2.384  0.654
  (0.225)    (0.204)
   [0.553]    [0.019]
Social Sciences  0.760 0.411   0.503  0.412
   (0.118)    (0.107)
   [0.008]    [0.002]
Vocational/Technical  0.218 0.255   0.164  0.240
   (0.140)    (0.129)
   [0.456]    [0.441]
Remedial  1.156 0.156   0.425  0.143
   (0.153)    (0.079)
   [0.768]    [0.456]
Other  1.400 0.204   0.897  0.196
   (0.129)    (0.106)
     [0.553]      [0.456]





















  (1) (2) (3)  (4) 
Term GPA 1st semester after RA  2.203 0.182 0.040  0.381
   (0.085) (0.107)  (0.109)
Term GPA 2nd semester after RA 2.171 0.068 ‐0.225  0.361
   (0.104) (0.147)  (0.152)
Hours per week spent:       
On campus 1st semester   11.980 0.066 ‐0.148  0.437
   (0.321) (0.387)  (0.478)
Studying 1st semester   8.847 0.119 ‐0.578  0.639
   (0.457) (0.677)  (0.576)
On campus 2nd semester   6.129 0.476 ‐0.042  1.472
   (0.390) (0.541)  (0.588)
Studying 2nd semester   4.470 0.684 ‐0.458  1.758
     (0.519) (0.808)  (0.713)













Working Paper Series 
 
A series of research studies on regional economic issues relating to the Seventh Federal 
Reserve District, and on financial and economic topics. 
 
U.S. Corporate and Bank Insolvency Regimes: An Economic Comparison and Evaluation  WP-06-01 
Robert R. Bliss and George G. Kaufman 
 
Redistribution, Taxes, and the Median Voter  WP-06-02 
Marco Bassetto and Jess Benhabib 
 
Identification of Search Models with Initial Condition Problems  WP-06-03 
Gadi Barlevy and H. N. Nagaraja 
 
Tax Riots  WP-06-04 
Marco Bassetto and Christopher Phelan 
 
The Tradeoff between Mortgage Prepayments and Tax-Deferred Retirement Savings  WP-06-05 
Gene Amromin, Jennifer Huang,and Clemens Sialm 
 
Why are safeguards needed in a trade agreement?  WP-06-06 
Meredith A. Crowley 
 
Taxation, Entrepreneurship, and Wealth  WP-06-07 
Marco Cagetti and Mariacristina De Nardi 
 
A New Social Compact: How University Engagement Can Fuel Innovation  WP-06-08 
Laura Melle, Larry Isaak, and Richard Mattoon  
 
Mergers and Risk  WP-06-09 
Craig H. Furfine and Richard J. Rosen 
 
Two Flaws in Business Cycle Accounting  WP-06-10 
Lawrence J. Christiano and Joshua M. Davis 
 
Do Consumers Choose the Right Credit Contracts?  WP-06-11 
Sumit Agarwal, Souphala Chomsisengphet, Chunlin Liu, and Nicholas S. Souleles 
 
Chronicles of a Deflation Unforetold  WP-06-12 
François R. Velde 
 
Female Offenders Use of Social Welfare Programs Before and After Jail and Prison: 
Does Prison Cause Welfare Dependency?  WP-06-13 
Kristin F. Butcher and Robert J. LaLonde 
 
Eat or Be Eaten: A Theory of Mergers and Firm Size  WP-06-14 
Gary Gorton, Matthias Kahl, and Richard Rosen 
 
   2 
Working Paper Series (continued) 
 
Do Bonds Span Volatility Risk in the U.S. Treasury Market? 
A Specification Test for Affine Term Structure Models  WP-06-15 
Torben G. Andersen and Luca Benzoni 
 
Transforming Payment Choices by Doubling Fees on the Illinois Tollway  WP-06-16 
Gene Amromin, Carrie Jankowski, and Richard D. Porter 
 
How Did the 2003 Dividend Tax Cut Affect Stock Prices?  WP-06-17 
Gene Amromin, Paul Harrison, and Steven Sharpe 
 
Will Writing and Bequest Motives: Early 20th Century Irish Evidence  WP-06-18 
Leslie McGranahan 
 
How Professional Forecasters View Shocks to GDP  WP-06-19 
Spencer D. Krane 
 
Evolving Agglomeration in the U.S. auto supplier industry  WP-06-20 
Thomas Klier and Daniel P. McMillen 
 
Mortality, Mass-Layoffs, and Career Outcomes: An Analysis using Administrative Data  WP-06-21 
Daniel Sullivan and Till von Wachter 
 
The Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures:  
Tying One’s Hand through the WTO.  WP-06-22 
Meredith A. Crowley 
 
How Did Schooling Laws Improve Long-Term Health and Lower Mortality?  WP-06-23 
Bhashkar Mazumder 
 
Manufacturing Plants’ Use of Temporary Workers: An Analysis Using Census Micro Data  WP-06-24 
Yukako Ono and Daniel Sullivan 
 
What Can We Learn about Financial Access from U.S. Immigrants?  WP-06-25 
Una Okonkwo Osili and Anna Paulson 
 
Bank Imputed Interest Rates: Unbiased Estimates of Offered Rates?  WP-06-26 
Evren Ors and Tara Rice 
 
Welfare Implications of the Transition to High Household Debt  WP-06-27 
Jeffrey R. Campbell and Zvi Hercowitz 
 
Last-In First-Out Oligopoly Dynamics  WP-06-28 
Jaap H. Abbring and Jeffrey R. Campbell 
 
Oligopoly Dynamics with Barriers to Entry  WP-06-29 
Jaap H. Abbring and Jeffrey R. Campbell 
 
Risk Taking and the Quality of Informal Insurance: Gambling and Remittances in Thailand  WP-07-01 
Douglas L. Miller and Anna L. Paulson 
 3 
Working Paper Series (continued) 
 
Fast Micro and Slow Macro: Can Aggregation Explain the Persistence of Inflation?  WP-07-02 
Filippo Altissimo, Benoît Mojon, and Paolo Zaffaroni 
 
Assessing a Decade of Interstate Bank Branching  WP-07-03 
Christian Johnson and Tara Rice 
 
Debit Card and Cash Usage: A Cross-Country Analysis  WP-07-04 
Gene Amromin and Sujit Chakravorti 
 
The Age of Reason: Financial Decisions Over the Lifecycle  WP-07-05 
Sumit Agarwal, John C. Driscoll, Xavier Gabaix, and David Laibson 
 
Information Acquisition in Financial Markets: a Correction  WP-07-06 
Gadi Barlevy and Pietro Veronesi 
 
Monetary Policy, Output Composition and the Great Moderation  WP-07-07 
Benoît Mojon 
 
Estate Taxation, Entrepreneurship, and Wealth  WP-07-08 
Marco Cagetti and Mariacristina De Nardi 
 
Conflict of Interest and Certification in the U.S. IPO Market  WP-07-09 
Luca Benzoni and Carola Schenone 
 
The Reaction of Consumer Spending and Debt to Tax Rebates – 
Evidence from Consumer Credit Data  WP-07-10 
Sumit Agarwal, Chunlin Liu, and Nicholas S. Souleles 
 
Portfolio Choice over the Life-Cycle when the Stock and Labor Markets are Cointegrated  WP-07-11 
Luca Benzoni, Pierre Collin-Dufresne, and Robert S. Goldstein 
 
Nonparametric Analysis of Intergenerational Income Mobility   WP-07-12 
with Application to the United States 
Debopam Bhattacharya and Bhashkar Mazumder 
 
How the Credit Channel Works: Differentiating the Bank Lending Channel  WP-07-13 
and the Balance Sheet Channel 
Lamont K. Black and Richard J. Rosen 
 
Labor Market Transitions and Self-Employment  WP-07-14 
Ellen R. Rissman 
 
First-Time Home Buyers and Residential Investment Volatility  WP-07-15 
Jonas D.M. Fisher and Martin Gervais 
 
Establishments Dynamics and Matching Frictions in Classical Competitive Equilibrium  WP-07-16 
Marcelo Veracierto 
 
Technology’s Edge: The Educational Benefits of Computer-Aided Instruction  WP-07-17 
Lisa Barrow, Lisa Markman, and Cecilia Elena Rouse 
 4 
Working Paper Series (continued) 
 
The Widow’s Offering: Inheritance, Family Structure, and the Charitable Gifts of Women  WP-07-18 
Leslie McGranahan 
 
Demand Volatility and the Lag between the Growth of Temporary   
and Permanent Employment  WP-07-19 
Sainan Jin, Yukako Ono, and Qinghua Zhang 
 
A Conversation with 590 Nascent Entrepreneurs  WP-07-20 
Jeffrey R. Campbell and Mariacristina De Nardi 
 
Cyclical Dumping and US Antidumping Protection: 1980-2001  WP-07-21 
Meredith A. Crowley 
 
Health Capital and the Prenatal Environment:  
The Effect of Maternal Fasting During Pregnancy  WP-07-22 
Douglas Almond and Bhashkar Mazumder 
 
The Spending and Debt Response to Minimum Wage Hikes  WP-07-23 
Daniel Aaronson, Sumit Agarwal, and Eric French 
 
The Impact of Mexican Immigrants on U.S. Wage Structure  WP-07-24 
Maude Toussaint-Comeau 
 
A Leverage-based Model of Speculative Bubbles  WP-08-01 
Gadi Barlevy 
 
Displacement, Asymmetric Information and Heterogeneous Human Capital  WP-08-02 
Luojia Hu and Christopher Taber 
 
BankCaR (Bank Capital-at-Risk): A credit risk model for US commercial bank charge-offs  WP-08-03 
Jon Frye and Eduard Pelz 
 
Bank Lending, Financing Constraints and SME Investment  WP-08-04 
Santiago Carbó-Valverde, Francisco Rodríguez-Fernández, and Gregory F. Udell 
 
Global Inflation  WP-08-05 
Matteo Ciccarelli and Benoît Mojon 
 
Scale and the Origins of Structural Change  WP-08-06 
Francisco J. Buera and Joseph P. Kaboski 
 
Inventories, Lumpy Trade, and Large Devaluations  WP-08-07 
George Alessandria, Joseph P. Kaboski, and Virgiliu Midrigan 
 
School Vouchers and Student Achievement: Recent Evidence, Remaining Questions  WP-08-08 
Cecilia Elena Rouse and Lisa Barrow 
 
   5 
Working Paper Series (continued) 
 
Does It Pay to Read Your Junk Mail? Evidence of the Effect of Advertising on 
Home Equity Credit Choices  WP-08-09 
Sumit Agarwal and Brent W. Ambrose 
The Choice between Arm’s-Length and Relationship Debt: Evidence from eLoans  WP-08-10 
Sumit Agarwal and Robert Hauswald 
 
Consumer Choice and Merchant Acceptance of Payment Media  WP-08-11 
Wilko Bolt and Sujit Chakravorti 
 
Investment Shocks and Business Cycles  WP-08-12 
Alejandro Justiniano, Giorgio E. Primiceri, and Andrea Tambalotti 
 
New Vehicle Characteristics and the Cost of the  
Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standard  WP-08-13 
Thomas Klier and Joshua Linn 
 
Realized Volatility  WP-08-14 
Torben G. Andersen and Luca Benzoni 
 
Revenue Bubbles and Structural Deficits: What’s a state to do?  WP-08-15 
Richard Mattoon and Leslie McGranahan 
 
The role of lenders in the home price boom  WP-08-16 
Richard J. Rosen 
 
Bank Crises and Investor Confidence  WP-08-17 
Una Okonkwo Osili and Anna Paulson 
 
Life Expectancy and Old Age Savings  WP-08-18 
Mariacristina De Nardi, Eric French, and John Bailey Jones 
 
Remittance Behavior among New U.S. Immigrants  WP-08-19 
Katherine Meckel 
 
Birth Cohort and the Black-White Achievement Gap:  
The Roles of Access and Health Soon After Birth  WP-08-20 
Kenneth Y. Chay, Jonathan Guryan, and Bhashkar Mazumder 
 
Public Investment and Budget Rules for State vs. Local Governments  WP-08-21 
Marco Bassetto 
 
Why Has Home Ownership Fallen Among the Young?  WP-09-01 
Jonas D.M. Fisher and Martin Gervais 
 
Why do the Elderly Save? The Role of Medical Expenses  WP-09-02 
Mariacristina De Nardi, Eric French, and John Bailey Jones 
 
Using Stock Returns to Identify Government Spending Shocks  WP-09-03 
Jonas D.M. Fisher and Ryan Peters 
   6 
Working Paper Series (continued) 
 
Stochastic Volatility  WP-09-04 
Torben G. Andersen and Luca Benzoni 
 
The Effect of Disability Insurance Receipt on Labor Supply  WP-09-05 
Eric French and Jae Song 
 
CEO Overconfidence and Dividend Policy  WP-09-06 
Sanjay Deshmukh, Anand M. Goel, and Keith M. Howe 
 
Do Financial Counseling Mandates Improve Mortgage Choice and Performance?   WP-09-07 
Evidence from a Legislative Experiment   
Sumit Agarwal,Gene Amromin, Itzhak Ben-David, Souphala Chomsisengphet, 
and Douglas D. Evanoff 
 
Perverse Incentives at the Banks? Evidence from a Natural Experiment  WP-09-08   
Sumit Agarwal and Faye H. Wang 
 
Pay for Percentile  WP-09-09 
Gadi Barlevy and Derek Neal 
 
The Life and Times of Nicolas Dutot  WP-09-10 
François R. Velde 
 
Regulating Two-Sided Markets: An Empirical Investigation  WP-09-11 
Santiago Carbó Valverde, Sujit Chakravorti, and Francisco Rodriguez Fernandez 
 
The Case of the Undying Debt  WP-09-12 
François R. Velde  
 
Paying for Performance: The Education Impacts of a Community College Scholarship 
Program for Low-income Adults  WP-09-13 
Lisa Barrow, Lashawn Richburg-Hayes, Cecilia Elena Rouse, and Thomas Brock 
 
 
 
 
 